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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 78 
Accident time: 12:05 Accident Date: 06/08/1997 
Where it occurred: Gulany Haji Farag, 
Derbandikhan District 
Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 25/08/1997 
ID original source: SB/AS Name of source: MAG 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 




The demining group was operating a three-man team with a two-man drill at the time of the 
accident. One man used the detector, marked any readings, and another man came forward 
to excavate the reading, feel for tripwires and cut any undergrowth. A third man at any one 
time was resting. 
A "Senior Mines Specialist" for the demining group carried out an investigation and the report 
was made available. There was considerable doubt about the reliability of the statements 
taken during an original investigation so further interviews were conducted and the report 
prepared (not dated but sometime after 24th August) from which the following is taken. There 
were two separate accidents occurring five minutes apart at the same site. This was the 
second of these accidents. 
The victim began clearance and located a series of PMNs (six in all). He marked each mine 
with a wooden picket.  As he worked, he marked his lane by taking markers from the right 
side of the lane and placing them on the left. 
The Team leader was preparing to destroy the discovered mines when he was injured in the 
first mine accident on the site that day [See accident No.227]. After the Supervisor had dealt 
with that accident he went looking for the deminer who had found the mines, intending to 
appoint him as the acting Team Leader.  
The deminer later said that he was returning to the lane to collect his equipment, but the 
investigator decided that he was trying to conceal his incorrect marking of the lane. The 
investigator thought it likely that he was using a spike to knock in the marking stakes when he 
slipped and detonated a mine, possibly with the spike. 
The victim was given first aid and taken to the Emergency hospital in Sulymania. He was not 
given an IV infusion. 
[The protective equipment worn by the victim was not recorded.] 
 
Recommendations 
The investigator recommended that all staff should be briefed on the need to adhere to SOPs, 
that staff should be told that if they saw unsafe practices they could refuse to work, that an 
addition to SOPs should be written to cover PMN minefields and that medics must be told 
"again" to administer an IV cannula to all mine casualties. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 108 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 33 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 








COMMENT: See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report from the “Emergency hospital” stated: 
Admitted 06/08/97 following a mine injury.     Discharged 18/08/97 
Diagnosis: 
Crushed injury left hand (compound fracture 3rd metacarpal with loss of articular 
surface. 
Superficial injury to Left arm, neck, Right thigh and Left leg. 
Deaf – pain in both ears following explosion. 
Debridement of all wounds in OT. 
10/08/97  DBR left arm and delayed primary suture Left leg in OT. 
13/08/97   Seen by ENT surgeon 
Bilateral perforation of both tympanic membranes. 
Suffering from tinnitus. 
Treat with antihistemine, Stemetil, Amoxicillin, protect from water completely. 
See again after 1 month. 
16/08/97   DPC Left arm and Left thigh in OT. 
18/08/97  Discharged – to attend OPD for dressings every third day. 
02/09/97  Wounds clean. To attend hospital for dressings for approximately 2-3 weeks. 
Hearing improved. To attend ENT clinic on 14/09/97. 
 
Analysis 
The accident is classed as a “missed mine” accident because the Victim was apparently 
placing marking pegs to delineate the cleared area (which he had neglected to do properly as 
he worked) when he detonated a mine. He clearly believed he had cleared the area where he 
was hammering in markers, so he had “missed” the mine. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working in breach of SOPs and his errors were not corrected. That he had been selected 
for a temporary position of authority prior to the accident raises questions about the selection 
method and the lack of appropriate training. Other mines had been missed in the area, which 
reinforces the view that field control was inadequate and that training was suspect. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems likely that Victim had been 
influenced (excited) by the accident and was rushing to correct an error without thinking 
properly about where to position the sticks. 
The victim may not have been wearing his helmet and visor, or may have had his visor raised. 
However, the short visor (attached to a helmet) issued by this demining group may have 
allowed the victim to sustain throat injuries while wearing his equipment correctly. The gap 
between a collar and the visor can be wide, especially when the helmet is tipped back on the 
head and the visor standing well away from the face.   
 
3 
